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Abstract 
This paper extends Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), hence NT, model with an explicit 
financial intermediary that transfer funds from households to entrepreneurs 
subject to a well defined loan production function. The loan productivity shock is 
treated as the supply side financial disturbance. Together with NT’s net worth 
shock that resembles the credit demand perturbation, both of the two-sided shocks 
are robustly extracted by combining the model with US quarterly data. The two 
shocks are found to be tightly linked with the post-war recessions. Each recession 
happens when both of the two shocks become contractionary. A few potential 
economic downturns seem to have been avoided because of the expansion of credit 
which offset the simultaneous contraction of entrepreneurial net wealth. This new 
introduced shock has significant explanatory power for the variance of EFP and 
the model simulated EFP holds high correlation with various spreads as proxies 
for empirical EFP. 
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1  Introduction 
The very recent financial crisis and possibly ongoing economic recession 
demonstrated that the financial sector should be an important factor which can 
influence the economic activity. As stated in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), we no 
longer need to appeal either to the Great Depression or to the experiences of many 
emerging market economies to motivate interest on the role of financial factors in 
aggregate fluctuations since the worst financial crisis and economic downturn of the 
post war era is currently undergoing. 
The importance of financial factor in shaping business cycle has been studied 
extensively in the literature. One of the most significant contributions in dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) context is by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999), BGG hereafter. They develop a so-called financial accelerator mechanism and 
demonstrate that the existence of an optimal financial contracting, in an environment 
of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, can help magnify and 
propagate the responses of the economy to some main underlying shocks (e.g., 
monetary and total factor productivity (TFP)). Thus the financial markets may 
unavoidably increase the volatility of the economy through the endogenous variation 
of financial frictions. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the financial sector in BGG solely plays a role of 
transmitting shocks originating from other sectors. Thus the framework only captures 
one branch of the financial factors which should also include the fact that financial 
structure of the economy can also be an independent source of volatilities as 
suggested by recent economic events. For this reason, the importance of financial 
sector as an original source of aggregate fluctuations is still under investigation. 
To fill this gap, this paper tries to explore the quantitative role of financial sector 
disturbances in shaping the US business cycle. Built on the model developed in Zhang 
(2010), I am able to introduce two financial sector shocks into the model from two 
different sources. One is the shock to the loan management technology. We treat it as 
the supply side disturbance because it lies within the banking sector. The other shock 
stems from the demand side of the financial sector, characterizing as the shock to the 
entrepreneurial net worth. It is of importance to introduce the two shocks together so 
that we have a complete picture in mind how the disturbances originating from the 
financial sector affect the aggregate economy.  
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Before moving to the results, it is useful to have a brief review of related studies in 
order to keep the literature on track. One notable contribution recently is by Nolan 
and Thoenissen (2009), henceforth NT. They extract the entrepreneurial net wealth 
shock along with the TFP and monetary shocks for US economy from a DSGE model 
with financial accelerator mechanism a la BGG and name it as a shock to the 
efficiency of the financial contract. They try to distil the contribution to US business 
cycle of financial shock on top of the financial friction mechanism. They conclude 
that their extracted financial shock process is found to (i) be very tightly linked with 
the onset of recessions, more so than TFP or monetary shocks; (ii) remains 
contractionary after recessions have ended; (iii) account for a large part of the 
variance of GDP; (iv) be strongly negatively correlated with the external finance 
premium (EFP).  
Despite these promising findings, the financial shock constructed in NT shouldn’t be 
considered as a complete description of the disturbance in the financial sector because 
they only considered the demand side. It is important to recognize that both BGG and 
NT only considered the demand side of the financial markets. The financial friction 
developed in BGG is built upon the balance sheet of entrepreneurial sector. 
Entrepreneurial net worth is crucial to determine the cost of external funds which can 
influence the demand of external funds by entrepreneurs. Similarly, if the net worth is 
subject to stochastic disturbance, the shock only affects the entrepreneurial balance 
sheet and the demand side of the financial market. Regard the recent financial crisis, it 
seems more appropriate to also think about the effects from the supply side of the 
financial market, the financial intermediaries/banking sector.  
Up to date, several studies have been considering the banking sector in determining 
the financial frictions on the one hand, and the disturbance in financial intermediaries 
as a source of business fluctuations on the other. Markovic (2006) introduces the bank 
capital channel in the monetary transmission mechanism on top of the corporate 
balance sheet channel as in BGG and highlights three sub-channels in the banking 
sector (supply side): default risk channel, adjustment cost channel and capital loss 
channel. He concludes that all the three channels in the banking sector reinforce the 
aggregate credit channel in the monetary transmission mechanism and increase the 
effects significantly in the event of large shocks to the value of bank capital. Zhang 
(2009) considers the bank’s balance sheet effect from a different angle where banking 
sector is assumed to share the risk with entrepreneurial sector. When the economy is 
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subject to large adverse shock, both the entrepreneurial and banking sector balance 
sheets are exposed to the risk and the deterioration of the two balance sheets reinforce 
each other and drive the economy down further. Aguiar and Drumond (2009) also 
emphasize the relevance of bank capital channel in determining the aggregate 
fluctuations, but from the Basel regulatory perspective.  
Most of the studies (e.g., above studies) focusing on the bank capital channel in the 
model’s transmission mechanism also stress the significance of disturbance to bank 
capital per se, but to a limited extend. They only deal with the impulse response 
conditional on the bank capital shock, but generally ignore the explicit time series 
process of the shock and its influence on the whole business cycle. One notable 
exception is Hirakata et al. (2010) who estimate a DSGE model with banking sector 
using Bayesian methodology and extract the shocks to the bank’s net worth. Based on 
variance decomposition, shocks to the banking sector are found to be a main source of 
the spread variations and play a significant role for investment volatility.  
All these studies convey an important signal that supply side friction and disturbance 
in the financial sector are also relevant to aggregate fluctuations; thus should be 
dictated for more attention and exploration. This paper works along this line and 
focuses on the role of supply side disturbance in financial market in shaping the 
business cycle. Specifically, the model generally follows the setup of BGG and NT 
except that I replace the optimal contracting problem between lender and borrower 
with explicit profit maximization in banking sector subject to a loan production 
function. The profit maximization in banking sector can predict a relationship 
between EFP and corporate balance sheet condition as well as factor price in the 
banking sector. In this way, both the demand side (entrepreneurial sector) and the 
supply side (banking sector) contribute to the financial frictions. The shock to the 
technology in loan production manifests itself as the disturbance in banking sector. 
With the shock to entrepreneurial net wealth, we can see the perturbation in both of 
the supply and demand side in financial markets. By and large, this strategy extends 
the work of NT by allowing another shock in the banking sector on top of the net 
worth shock to affect the financial sector and the whole economy on the one hand, 
and distinguish itself to the work of Hirakata et al. (2010) who designate the 
disturbance in banking sector to bank net wealth on the other1. 
                                                              
1  Current model is different from that in Hirakata et al. (2010) in other respective as well. In Hirakata 
et al. (2010), more shocks are used since they apply the Bayesian estimation where I follow the 
shock construction procedure developed in Benk et al. (2005), (2008).  
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The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First of all, use 
the shock construction procedure discussed in details below, I can extract the four 
shocks in which TFP, monetary and net worth shocks are close to their counterparts in 
NT on the one hand, and TFP as well as monetary shocks are observationally similar 
to the ones constructed with traditional estimation procedure on the other. This can be 
treated as a robust check that the inclusion of another shock wouldn’t alter the 
processes of shocks originally generated in NT despite the fact that my model setup is 
slightly different from theirs.  
Second, subject to the interesting, but also a little bit confusing result in NT that the 
net worth shock remains contractionary after recessions have ended, it is promising to 
find that, after adding in the loan productivity shock, all the post war recessions 
happen only when both of the entrepreneurial net worth and the loan productivity 
shocks are in contraction, implying either one of them is not strong enough to cause 
an economy-wide recession.  
Third, both of the extracted loan productivity and net worth shock are negatively 
correlated with proxies of EFP, despite the fact that the correlation between net worth 
shock and EFP is higher in absolute value. We can conjecture from it, that the loan 
productivity shock is also significant in shaping the financial business cycle even if it 
is not the dominant one.  
Fourth, consistent with our prediction, the variance decomposition indicates that loan 
productivity shock is an important source of EFP variation, though the dominant 
driving force is still net worth shock. This somehow matches the result in Hirakata et 
al. (2010) in which they predict a quantitatively similar feature of bank capital shock 
in determining EFP. Even though we assume the shock in the banking sector with 
different essence, Hirakata et al. (2010) and I reach similar result in this dimension. 
Finally, net worth shock is still a dominant factor along several other dimensions of 
the economy after we include the loan productivity shock, more important than TFP 
and monetary shock in determining output, investment, loan, hours and federal funds 
rate, while the loan productivity shock plays a minor role. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives the model used in this 
study. Section 3 calibrates the model to quarterly data of post-war US economy. The 
construction of all shock processes and numerical simulation are carried out in section 
4. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks. 
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2  The model 
The designated model I develop here is a standard DSGE New Keynesian model 
largely follows BGG’s original setup and NT’s extension except for the fact that I 
develop the financial frictions with a fully micro-founded loan production function 
and a financial intermediaries’ profit maximization problem instead of BGG’s original 
optimal contracting problem. The other one is that I introduce one more shock from 
the supply side of financial market on top of the net wealth shock from the demand 
side as in NT.  
Besides the banking sector, the model economy is inhabited by households, three 
types of producers: entrepreneurs, capital producers, and retailers, and a government 
who conducts monetary policy. Households own differentiated labour service and 
have the power to set the nominal wage in the labour market as in Erceg et al. (2000). 
Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods and borrow from banks that convert 
household deposits into business financing for the purchase of capital. The presence 
of collateral evaluation and labour monitoring costs create the financial friction, 
which causes loan interest rate higher than deposit interest rate. This makes the 
entrepreneurial demand for capital depends on their financial position and the supply 
of external funds depends on the state of the economy. The interaction between the 
demand and supply equilibrates the credit market. Capital producers purchase 
investment goods and build new capital to sell to the entrepreneurs. This captures the 
up and down movement of asset prices. Retailers present because it is more 
convenient to introduce nominal stickiness this way to keep track of the development 
in conventional dynamic New Keynesian framework. They set nominal prices in a 
staggered fashion a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). 
2.1  Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of monopolistically competitive 
households, indexed by ]1,0[j ,  who consume, work and save. Each of them 
supplies differentiated labour service to the entrepreneurial and banking sector, which 
regard each of their labour service as an imperfect substitute for that of others. In this 
setup, entrepreneurs and banks demand bundles of labour services, which is obtained 
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using the aggregation scheme as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
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The optimal substitution across labour service leads to the following labour demand 
equation regarding the j th labour service 
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where )( jWt is the nominal wage set by the j th household, tW is the Dixit-Stiglitz 
aggregate nominal wage given by )1(11 ])([ ww djjWW tt
  , and w gives the 
constant elasticity of substitution across labour service. 
To motivate the demand for money, I follow Sidrauski-Brock and include money in 
the utility function of households2. Thus the j th household derives the expected life 
time utility from consumption (with external habit) of final goods,  )( jCt , real 
balance holding,  tt PjM )( , and leisure, )(1 jNt ; with discount factor,  )1,0( , 
this is given by 
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where tC is aggregate consumption, 
c , m and x measure the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution for consumption, real balance and leisure. m and 
x represent the weight on real balance and leisure in the utility function.  
The j th household enters period t   with )(1 jDP tt   units of nominal deposits in a 
financial intermediary, and nominal money balances,  )(1 jM t  . While deposits pay a 
gross nominal interest rate,  ntR 1 , between 1t  and t , money balances bear no 
interest. During period t , the j th household supplies labour to the entrepreneur 
firms and banks, for which he receives total factor payment of )()( jNjW tt . In 
addition, he receives a lump-sum transfer from the monetary authority,  )( jt , as well 
                                                              
2  This setup follows Nolan and Thoenissen (2008). 
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as the dividend payments,  )( jFt , from banks and,  )( jRt , from retailers, as he 
owns both of them. All these funds are allocated for consumption, )( jCP tt , money 
holdings, )( jM t , and nominal deposit holdings,  )(1 jDP tt  . Thus the household’s 
intertemporal budget constraint, in real terms, is 
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The j th household chooses )( jCt , tt PjM )( , and )(1 jDt in order to maximize his 
expected lifetime utility subject to his budget constraint and labour demand constraint. 
The first order conditions (F.O.Cs) for this optimization problem are3: 
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U 1 ;                                       (2)                           
Eq. (1) is the usual intertemporal condition, which states that the marginal cost of 
fore-going a unit of consumption in the current period must be compensated with the 
marginal benefit in the following period. Eq. (2) is the money demand equation.  
Given that the households set nominal wages in staggered contracts with a constant 
probability,  w1 , of renegotiation in each period, the fraction of households who 
have the opportunity to reset their wages will set it as a mark-up over the marginal 
rate of substitution of leisure for consumption ( MRS ) taking account the probability 
that he cannot reset the wage again. The fraction of households who don’t have the 
opportunity to reoptimise must apply the wages that was in effect in the preceding 
period indexed by the steady state gross rate of wage inflation  . This yields the 
following maximization problem: 
                                                              
3  The omission of households’ index in the F.O.Cs stems from the assumption following Erceg et al. 
(2000) and Christiano et al. (2005) that the implicit existence of state-contingent securities ensures 
households’ consumption and asset holding are homogenous. 
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The F.O.C for the maximization problem is 
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Log-linear approximations of the F.O.C imply the following wage inflation curve: 
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where t  is the gross wage inflation and t  is the multiplier of households’ budget 
constraint. 
2.2  Entrepreneurs 
The entrepreneurial sector largely follows the original BGG setup4. In each period, 
entrepreneurs combine hired labour and purchased capital to produce intermediate 
goods in a constant return to scale (CRS) technology. This aggregate production 
function is given by 
  1Gtttt NKAY ;                                         (4) 
where tY   is produced intermediate goods, GtN   is hired labour service, tK is capital 
purchased in last period and is capital share in production function. tA   is an 
exogenous technology measure capturing total factor productivity in goods sector. It 
follows 
attaat AAA   1lnln)1(ln ;                         (5) 
                                                              
4  Other similar expositions are Meier and Muller (2006), Gertler et al. (2007) and Christensen and Dib 
(2008). 
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with )1,0(a , ),0(~ 2aat iid  . Consider an entrepreneur’s decision making at the 
end of period t   as an example. At that moment, the entrepreneur needs to purchase 
capital,  1tK , that will be used in period 1t , at the price ttQP   ( tQ   is the relative 
price of capital goods in terms of the consumption goods). Thus the real cost of 
capital acquisition is 1tt KQ . The entrepreneur can only afford part of the expenditure, 
equalling to his net worth 1tNW , and rely on external funds for the rest. This requires 
a model of explicit credit market and lender, which is the financial intermediary/bank 
described in details later. The capital demand of entrepreneurs is determined by the 
equality of expected marginal external financing cost with expected marginal return of 
holding capital. 
        
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t
tttt
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
 ;             (6) 
where is the depreciation rate of capital, t   is the price of intermediate goods 
relative to final goods, and tQ , as described above, is the relative price of capital 
which varies because of the adjustment cost. Thus the expected return on capital 
consists of two aspects: the income gain of 11  ttt KY and the capital gain of 
)1(1 tQ . This return must be equal to the gross loan rate charged by financial 
intermediary/bank to ensure the optimal holding of capital by entrepreneurs.  
Given the existence of credit market imperfections, the gross loan rate ltt RE 1  will be 
equal to the multiplication of gross external finance premium 1tEFP  and gross 
deposit rate dtt RE 1 . The determination of 1tEFP   is shown in bank’s optimal loan 
production/management in the next sub-section. As described previously, since the 
bank promises to pay households a non-state contingent nominal rate of ntR , the real 
rate depends on the ex post inflation rate. Thus we would also see a debt deflation 
effect, a la Fisher (1933), in the credit markets. The key equation to show financial 
frictions in this model can be written as 
    


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111
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REFPRERE  ;                            (7) 
where ttt PP 11     is the gross inflation rate. On the other aspect, entrepreneurial 
demand for labour service is determined by equalizing the real wage with marginal 
product of labour: 
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Let’s leave the detailed exposition of financial frictions to the bank’s problem 
discussed below. To finish the entrepreneur’s problem, it is necessary to analyse the 
transition of their net worth. The existence of credit market implies that entrepreneurs 
are not allowed to fully self finance. In other words, they cannot accumulate their net 
worth forever. We can achieve this by assuming the exit and entry of entrepreneurs 
out and into the entrepreneurial sector. The probability that an entrepreneur will 
survive until the next period is    (i.e. there is a probability 1   that he dies in 
between periods), so entrepreneurs only have finite expected horizon )1(1   for 
operation. This assumption is vital, as it ensures that entrepreneurs never accumulate 
enough net wealth to finance new capital expenditure entirely and have to go to the 
credit market for external funds. The size of the entrepreneurial sector is constant, 
with new arrivals replacing departed entrepreneurs. The newly entered entrepreneurs 
receive some transferred seed money,  tS , for operation5. We can derive the evolution 
of entrepreneurs’ net worth as follows: 
ttttt
tt
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ttt SNWKQEFPE
RKQRxNW )1()]([ 1
1
1
11   

 ;      (9) 
where the first term in the square bracket represents the ex post return of holding 
capital in t  and the second is the cost of borrowing, which is the real interest rate 
implied by the loan contract signed in 1t . As borrowers sign a debt contract that 
specifies a nominal interest rate, the loan repayment in real terms depends on the ex 
post real interest rate. Thus an increase (decrease) in inflation will reduce (increase) 
the real cost of debt repayment and push up (down) the entrepreneurial net worth. The 
stochastic nature of net worth evolution is introduced by a random disturbance term 
tx , which follows the process 
              xttxt xx   1lnln ;                                     (10) 
where )1,0(x , ),0(~ 2xxt iid  . This random term shifts entrepreneurial net 
                                                              
5  Without this seed money, entering entrepreneurs would have no net worth, and so they would not be 
able to buy any capital. Also, among the entrepreneurs who survive there are some who are bankrupt 
and have no net worth. Without a transfer they would not be able to buy capital either. 
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worth up and down independently of movements in fundamentals. Christiano et al. 
(2010) interpret this shift factor as a reduced form way to capture what Alan 
Greenspan has called ‘irrational exuberance’, or simply asset price bubbles. NT 
follows Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) to treat this as a shock to the efficiency of 
contractual relations between borrowers and lenders so as to influence the degree of 
asymmetric information and costly state verification problem. I interpret this 
disturbance as a credit demand shock as it perturbs the financial condition of 
entrepreneurs and their demand for external finance. As shown below, this is justified 
by looking at the impulse response that tx   drives aggregate level of loan and EFP 
into the same direction, a distinguished characteristic of demand shock6. 
2.3  Banks 
The function of external finance channel in the model economy is determined by 
financial intermediaries/banks. They issue deposits to collect funds from households 
and then convert those funds into lending as corporate loans to entrepreneurs. To 
simplify the analysis, I omit any regulation of reserve or the existence of inter-bank 
markets7. The latter justifies the existence of a representative bank in the model 
economy. The absence of reserve requirement and positive loan rate imply that the 
bank will lend out whatever is deposited: tt DL  . Based on the assumption in 
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), the volume of loan supply (equivalent as the 
demand for deposit funds) is designed to be determined by a model of loan production, 
or more accurate, loan management, which is involved with collateral assessment and 
labour monitoring. This setup is motivated to capture the supply side of the credit 
market since in BGG the financial intermediaries exist passively to satisfy the demand 
of external funds by entrepreneurs. In what follows, the loan management is assumed 
to be conducted by combining the collateral for evaluation and labour effort for 
monitoring. The specification is in Cobb-Douglas fashion as follows: 
             
 
  111 )( Fttttt NKQFL ;                                 (11) 
                                                              
6  Note this explanation is not contradicted with either Christiano et al. (2010) or NT. Specifically, a 
positive shock to entrepreneurs’ net worth (asset bubble) can be thought of as a negative shock to 
credit demand since more investment can be financed internally; it can also be treated as a shock to 
the contractual efficiency that pushes down the EFP. 
7This can be partly justified that the reserve requirement is mostly for demand deposit, not time deposit 
considered here. Moreover, the bank in the model is in broader sense to capture the economy-wide 
credit. 
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where 1tL   is the amount of loan lending in period 1t determined at the end of 
period t . tQ   is the price of capital at the end of period t , thus 1tt KQ is the value of 
collateral at the begin-ning of time 1t . FtN   is the labour effort involved in loan 
monitoring, and    denotes for the share of collateral in loan production. tF   is an 
exogenous technology measure capturing total factor productivity in banking sector 
(loan supply shock), following 
          fttfft FFF   1lnln)1(ln  ;                      (12) 
with )1,0(f , ),0(~ 2fft iid  . It is noteworthy that Eq. (10) distinguishes itself 
to the original setting in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) that only economy-wide 
capital is used as collateral for loan production. The reasons are twofold. First, 
government bond is not necessary here since the model refrains from the analysis of it; 
the omission is a simplification. Moreover, to resemble BGG’s expression of financial 
friction (shown below), it is more appropriate to exclude bond from the loan 
production function.  
On the other hand, as described in section 2.2, entrepreneurs obtain the loan to finance 
the purchase of next period capital in excess of their net wealth 1tNW : 
            111   tttt NWKQL ;                                     (13) 
Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) together characterize the equilibrium in credit markets. 
The flow of funds of the typical FI at the end of period t   is the new arriving deposit 
funds and gross interest payment on existing loans, less the labour cost for monitoring, 
cost of collateral service, the new issuing loans and the gross interest payment on 
existing deposits. The FI chooses the collateral service 1tt KQ , labour monitoring 
effort FtN  and newly issued loan 1tL   and deposit 1tD  to maximize the expected 
life-time value in favour of the bank owners, households. The profit maximization 
problem of the bank is given by 
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;             
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subject to the bank balance sheet constraint tt DL    and loan production function 
Eq. (11), where CthCt
h UU    is the household’s stochastic discount factor. The F.O.Cs 
for this optimization problem are: 
                11
11 }{

 
ttt
q
td
t
ul
tt KQL
rRRE  ;                              (14) 
                Ftt
td
t
ul
tt NL
wRRE
1
11 )1(
}{

   ;                            (15) 
Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) apply the usual Baumal (1952) conditions, which equalize the 
marginal cost of intermediation to the factor prices of inputs divided by the marginal 
product of the inputs. As highlighted in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), this 
marginal cost cap-tures the idealized net uncollateralized external finance premium 
(UEFP) in the model, under the condition that entrepreneurs come to borrow without 
any collateral. Thus entrepreneurs have to pay full cost of intermediation: labour 
monitoring plus collateral service. In the other extreme, if entrepreneurs possess the 
full amount of collateral to borrow, they pay the full cost at the same time get back the 
return of collateral services. Therefore, the net EFP  for entrepreneurs is only the 
labour monitoring cost, which is the fraction 1   of the total cost. We call this the 
fully collateralized external finance premium (CEFP) in the model economy, 
represented as: 
          Ftt
t
t NL
wCEFP
1
1 1

  ;                                                        
In reality, the actual amount of EFP lies between UEFP and CEFP, since entrepreneurs 
own fraction of the total collateral value in the whole economy, given 
by 11  ttt KQNW . The exact EFP is determined by this ratio: 
                    ]1)[1(1
1
1
11


 
tt
t
tt KQ
NWUEFPEFP  ;                (16) 
 Combine Eq. (16) and Eq. (15), after some rearrangements, to get 
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 ;     (17) 
Eq. (17) highlights the key relationship between EFP  and the ratio of internal funds 
to purchased capital value,  11  ttt KQNW , from the bank’s optimization behaviour. 
Given that tF   and tw are exogenous, and capital price is at steady state value of 
unity, we can derive the following proposition8: 
Proposition 1:  In equilibrium, assume tF and tw are exogenously given, and capital 
price is in steady state value. External finance premium is a 
decreasing and convex function of the ratio of net worth to 
purchased capital value. 
This proposition implies a very important inference comparable to BGG: The external 
finance premium is higher the more entrepreneurs rely on external funds. Figure 1 
plots the gross EFP against the ratio of net worth to the value of purchased capital 
with arbitrary calibration ( 77.0 , 69.2F , 12.2w ): 
                    
Fig. 1  External finance premium and ratio of net worth to capital value 
 
Figure 1 shows that the EFP  decreases as less external funds is needed with given 
value of purchased capital (less leverage) in an diminishing rate. This implies that 
                                                              
8  This proposition has already been shown in the last chapter. The only reason to put it here again is to 
make this chapter self-contained. 
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EFP in steady state will increase dramatically even after you reduce the internal funds 
relative to capital value by only a small amount. This shows the mechanism of the 
accelerator effect embedded in the banking sector of the baseline model. To see the 
dynamic relationship, I derive the log-linear form of Eq. (17) around the non- 
stochastic steady state: 
   
)ˆ
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1ˆ 11
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;  (17L) 
Eq. (17L) elaborates the behind the scene accelerator effect from the banking sector in 
the baseline model. The short run dynamics of EFP depends on the dynamics of the 
net worth to capital value ratio, real wage for labour monitoring and exogenous loan 
production tech-nology. Thus Eq. (17L) is highly comparable with the counterpart 
reduced form equation in BGG framework of the form: 
          )ˆ
ˆˆ(ˆ 111 tttt qkwnpef    ; 
BGG claims that the elasticity of external finance premium with respect to the ratio of 
internal funds to total value of capital is derived from an optimal contracting problem 
between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries. Higher net worth relative to value 
of purchased capital makes more funds of entrepreneurial sector sink into the project. 
Thus the incentives are more aligned between entrepreneurs and banks so as to reduce 
the asymmetric information problem and EFP. The baseline model with loan 
management also predicts a similar aggregate relationship as in BGG, despite the fact 
that the corresponding elasticity is shown differently by an expression nesting steady 
state value of EFP and internal funds to total value of capital ratio, and the parameter 
value of collateral share in loan production9. Besides this, the baseline model also 
highlights the importance of the real wage to influence the dynamics of EFP before 
subjecting to the exogenous shock in the banking sector10. All these promising 
increments are not considered in BGG and many other studies of financial accelerator. 
                                                              
9  The elasticity in BGG equals to   only after figuring out the optimal loan contract between 
entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries; it also depends on micro structure of the contract 
environment (e.g., average fraction of monitoring cost after the entrepreneurs default). See the 
appendix of BGG for details. 
10  Real wage becomes relevant because it is the factor price in loan management and affects the 
marginal cost of intermediation activity. 
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2.4  Capital producers 
Capital producers are included to rationalize the fluctuations in the real capital price 
tQ , since the volatile asset prices contribute to the fluctuations of entrepreneurial 
wealth. Consider there are perfectly competitive capital producers in the economy to 
control the supply of capital. They combine the purchased capital and investment 
funds to produce new capital,  tK~ , according to 
t
t
t
t KK
IK 


~ ; 
with 0)0(  , 0(.)  , 0(.)  . This increasing and concave function 
captures the presence of adjustment costs in the production of capital goods. Capital 
producers choose the investment expenditure in order to maximize their profit, 
ttt IKQ ~ , taking the relative price of capital as given. The first-order condition is 
             
1
)(




t
t
t K
IQ ;                                        (18) 
Here I restrict the capital production function so that the relative price of capital is 
unity in steady state. Capital producers’ decision is linked with the entrepreneurs’ 
capital-purchasing decision via the variation in the price of capital. 
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to 
              tt
t
t
t KKK
IK )1(1 


 ;                            (19) 
Note that capital is homogeneous, so there is no difference between newly-produced 
and old capital. Old capital used by entrepreneurs is rented out for the production of 
new capital, and then returned at the same price as the newly-produced capital. 
2.5  Retailers 
The retail sector is applied to introduce nominal rigidity into this economy. Here I 
assume that entrepreneurs sell all of their output goods to retailers. Retailers purchase 
the homogenous wholesale goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate them using a 
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linear technology at no resource cost and sell as final goods to households, capital 
producers and the government sector. In this way, the retailers have the monopolistic 
power to set the prices of these final goods. The reason why retailers are incorporated 
together with entrepreneurs is to avoid the complication of aggregating individual 
entrepreneur’s demand for capital and his net worth when entrepreneurs themselves 
are imperfect competitors. Ultimately retailers’ monopolistic profits belong to the 
households who own them, in contrast to entrepreneurs who are independent agents 
possessing their own wealth. Before exploring the retailers’ problem in details, I 
firstly derive the aggregation of final goods. The final goods tY  are bundles of 
differentiated goods )( jYt , ]1,0[j , provided by the continuum of monopolistically 
competitive retailers11. The aggregation follows the framework of Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) as 
 
1
1
0
1
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

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p
p
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djjYY tt




; 
where p is the elasticity of substitution between different goods. The optimal 
allocation of expenditure across differentiated goods implies a downward sloping 
demand function for goods j : 
                t
t
t
t YP
jPjY
p



 )()( ; 
where )( jPt   denotes the price of good )( jYt   , tY  denotes the aggregate demand, 
and  also measures the price elasticity of demand among differentiated goods. tP  
denotes the price index of final goods given by 
               
pp djjPP tt
 


  1
1
1
0
1)( ; 
Following Calvo (1983), and a discrete version as in Yun (1996), I assume that each 
retailer cannot reoptimize its selling price unless it receives a random signal. The 
probability that each retailer can reoptimize his price in a given period is p1 , 
                                                              
11  Recall that the assumption of linear technology for retailers ensures that the amount of final goods 
varies one-for-one with the amount of wholesale goods in the economy. 
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independently of other firms and of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus 
the average length of time a price remains unchanged is )1(1 p . Retailer j  who 
has the opportunity to reset its price in a given period t  choose the price, )(* jPt , 
that maximizes its expected discounted profits until the period when they are next 
able to change their price. On the other hand, the retailer who doesn’t have the 
opportunity to reset price must charge the price that was in effect in the preceding 
period indexed by the steady state gross rate of inflation,  . Retailer j ’s optimization 
problem is: 
)]()()[(
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UMaxE ht
ht
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h Ct
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   ; 
subject to the demand function of )( jYt . Note that the stochastic discount factor for 
expected profits consists of the probability that retailers can change their price and the 
households’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The F.O.C for the optimal 
problem is 
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;   (20) 
The aggregate price index is given by 
                    ppp ttt PPP
  
  1*11
1
)1( ; 
Log-linear approximations of the F.O.C and aggregate price index imply the following 
New Keynesian Phillips curve: 
                    t
p
pp
ttt E 
 ˆ)1)(1(ˆˆ 1   ;                    (20L) 
where tˆ   is the log deviation of real marginal cost from steady state. 
2.6  Government and monetary policy 
Finally I set the budget constraint for the government and the policy rule of the 
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monetary authority to close the whole model. The aggregate final output goods 
consist of households’ consumption, capital producers’ investment expenditure and 
the government expenditure,  tG . Every period, the market for final goods clears as 
        tttt GICY  ;                                       (21) 
where government expenditure is financed by lump-sum taxes and money creation 
            t
t
tt
t P
MMG  1 ; 
For monetary policy, I assume the monetary authority exogenously sets the gross 
growth rate of money,  t , such that the supply of real money balance evolves 
according to12 
       
t
t
ttt P
Pmm 11   ;                                         (22) 
The money growth rate is assumed to follow a stochastic AR(1) process as 
                mttmt   1lnln ;                                  (23)       
where )1,0(m , ),0(~ 2mmt iid  . 
2.7  Equilibrium 
In the baseline model economy, the equilibrium is defined as a set of endogenous 
variables },,,,,,,,,,,,,,,{ ttt
n
t
k
ttttttt
F
t
G
tttt EFPRRwQmLNWKNNICY    that satisfies 
households’ decision rules (1) and (2), wage inflation curve (3), entrepreneurs’ 
optimal conditions (6), (7) and (8), banks’ decision rule (17), capital producers’ 
optimal condition (18), New Key-nesian Phillips curve derived from retailers’ 
problem, (20),  resource constraints (4), (9), (11), (13), (19), (21), and the money 
growth rule (22). Thus the log-linear version of the system around the non-stochastic 
steady state can be derived as13:  
                                                              
12  The choice of money supply rule instead of interest rate rule is because of the large sample span 
from 1964 to 2009, following NT. 
13  For steady state solution, please refer to chapter one. 
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            tttt mm  ˆˆˆˆ 1   ;                                     (22L) 
Given the log-linear version of the stochastic processes 
                    attat aa   1ˆˆ ;                                       (5L)                
                    xttxt xx   1ˆˆ ;                                       (10L)              
                    fttft ff   1ˆˆ ;                                      (12L)                
                  mttmt   1ˆˆ ;                                (23L)              
Eq. (1L) to (13L) and (17L) to (23L) are the log-linear version corresponding to Eq. 
(1) to (13) and (17) to (23). Following the convention, all the variables with hat on top 
denote percentage deviations from non-stochastic steady state, where I omit the 
conditional expectations operator on the assumption of ‘Certainty Equivalence’. 
Using Uhlig’s undetermined coefficients procedure yields a state space solution of the 
form14: 
1211 ˆˆ   ttt ss  ;                                        (24)                   
        tt sd ˆ
ˆ
3 ;                                               (25)                   
where the state variable vector,  tsˆ , includes predetermined and exogenous variables; 
tdˆ is the vector of control variables; and the vector t contains the random 
innovations. The coefficient matrices,  1 , 2 , and 3 , have elements that depend 
on the structural parameters of the model. Therefore, the state space solution, (24) and 
(25) is used later to construct underlying shocks and simulate the model. 
3  Calibration 
Before using the log-linear system above to construct the shocks and simulate the 
model, it is necessary to set values to all the structural parameters. In what follows, I 
                                                              
14  The detailed methodological exposition is given in Uhlig (1999), whereby the Matlab programme is 
available at his homepage (http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wpol/html/toolkit.htm). 
  22 / 44 
 
set parameter values to calibrate the baseline model to quarterly data of the post war 
US economy. Since those parameter values are central to my shock extraction process, 
I try to keep them as close as possible to standard choice in the literature generally, 
and to NT specifically. There are in total 25 parameters, including those characterizing 
the shock processes. The discount rate    is set equal to 0.99 to match the average 
annual steady state real interest rate of 4%. The elasticity of substitution for 
consumption c , real balances m and leisure x are all set equal to conventional 
value 1.5, implying a nearly logarithmic utility function. Habit persistence parameter 
   is 0.6. The weight on real balances m equals to 0.0019 to match the average M1 
velocity of consumption. To reconcile the average working time of around 30%, the 
weight on leisure x is set to 2.47. The share of capital in goods production function 
  and the capital depreciation rate    are fairly standard in real business cycle 
(RBC) literature, to which we set value of 0.36 and 0.025. For entrepreneurs’ 
surviving rate in the end of each period   , I will use the value of 0.978, implying 
entrepreneurial average life of 45 quarters. The next two parameters,     and  , are 
key to BGG’s financial accelerator mechanism, since    measures the level of capital 
adjustment cost and so the response of investment to shocks and    directly captures 
the degree of financial accelerator effect. Despite the dispute over these two parameter 
values, I follow NT to set them to be 1 and 0.037 respectively15. For the share of 
collateral in loan production function  , I refer to all relevant studies considering 
loan production (e.g., Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), Benk, Gillman and Kejak 
(2005), (2008) and (2010), and Leao (2003)). Since their chosen values for  lie 
between 0.65 (lower bound) and 0.89 (upper bound), any value between the two 
bounds are plausible. I pick up a value of 0.803 to make the elasticity of EFP with 
respect to the net worth to capital ratio in the banking model match that set in NT. The 
parameters associated with price and wage rigidity also follow that in NT, where the 
elasticity of demand for goods p , and labour w , are 11 and 4 such that the steady 
state markups are 10% in the goods market and 33% in labour market, and the 
probability of not reoptimizing for price setters p , is 0.5 while that for wage setters 
w , is 0.75. 
Now we have calibrated values for 17 out of the 25 parameters, the last 8 are the 
parameters capturing the process of the underlying 4 shocks. Since the shock 
                                                              
15  Originally, BGG set equal to 0.25 and  equal to 0.05. These define a relatively low level of 
capital adjustment cost and high degree of financial accelerator effect. Christenson and Dib (2008) 
used maximum likelihood method to estimate the value of  be 0.59 and  be 0.042 for US 
economy in the post Volcker era. Meier and Muller (2006) found an even higher value of  , 0.65, 
but insignificant  . 
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processes are constructed in the next section, I give initial values for the 8 parameters 
in advance so that the model can be solved numerically. Some key steady state values 
in the model are also highlighted as follows. 
 
 
Table 1  Parameters in the model 
Parameter                                Description Value 
  Household’s discount factor  0.99 
xmc  ,,  Intertemporal elasticity of substitution  1.5 
m  Weight on real balances in utility  0.0019 
x  Weight on leisure in utility  2.47 
  Habit persistence  0.6 
  Share of capital in goods production  0.36 
  Capital depreciation rate  0.025 
p  Retailers’ probability of not able to reset price  0.5 
w  Households’ probability of not able to reset wage  0.75 
p  Goods elasticity of demand  11 
w  Labour elasticity of demand  4 
  Entrepreneurs’ surviving rate    0.978 
  Curvature of capital adjustment cost function  1 
  EFP elasticity of net worth to collateral value ratio  0.037 
  Share of collateral in loan production  0.803 
a  Autocorrelation of goods productivity shock  0.95 
m  Autocorrelation of money growth rate  0.65 
x  Autocorrelation of loan demand shock  0.9 
f  Autocorrelation of loan supply shock  0.9 
fxma  ,,,  Standard deviations of the four shocks  0.0075 
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Table 2  Steady state in the model economy 
Variable Definition Value 
            I. Steady state values 
A  Goods sector productivity level  1 
F  loan productivity level  2.15 
dR  Risk‐free rate  1.01 
kR  Gross return on capital  1.0176 
nR  Nominal interest rate  1.0194 
  Inflation rate  1.0092 
EFP   External financing premium  1.0075 
GN  Labour service in goods sector  0.3 
FN  Labour service in banking sector  0.005 
     II. Steady-state ratios 
KY /  Output to capital  0.13 
YI /  Investment to output  0.19 
YC   Consumption to output  0.61 
YG   Govt expenditure to output  0.2 
KL /  Leverage ratio  0.489 
NNF /   Financial hour to total hour  1.7% 
 
The external finance premium is generally unobservable in reality, hence we can only 
refer to some close indicators to pin down the steady state value. It is set to 1.0075 for 
baseline,corresponding to an annual risk spread of 300 basis points, approximating the 
post war average spread between the corporate bond rate and the three-month treasury 
bill rate. This is consistent with the estimates in Queijo (2009) and lies within the 
range reported in De Fiore and Uhlig (2005)16. The steady state quarterly gross 
inflation is set to 1.0092, implying the nominal interest rate of 1.0194. Following NT, 
the steady state leverage ratio of entrepreneurs is set to 48.9%, which means the ratio 
                                                              
16  In De Fiore and Uhlig (2005), the reported range for annual risk premiums on bonds and loans in 
U.S. is between 160 and 340 basis points. 
  25 / 44 
 
of net worth to value of purchased capital is 0.511. The steady state consumption, 
investment and government expenditure share of GDP are given by 0.603, 0.192 and 
0.205, respectively to match the historical average. In labour market, the steady state 
ratio of monitoring hour relative to goods produce hour is 1.7%. All the parameters 
and their calibrated values are described in table 1 while steady states are summarized 
in table 2. 
4  Empirical Results 
Based on the calibration discussed above, I carry on the evaluation of the empirical 
performance of the model. First of all, the four underlying shocks are constructed 
using the method proposed in Benk et al. (2005), (2008) and (2010) and NT. To check 
the robustness, the DSGE extracted TFP and monetary shock processes are compared 
to their counterparts derived from traditional estimation. Moreover, the two financial 
shocks are plotted against the post war recessions indicated by NBER on the one hand, 
and against the proxies of EFP on the other. The empirical performance of the model 
with financial shocks, both or either one, is evaluated by calculating second moments, 
historical decomposition and variance decomposition. 
4.1  Construction of shocks 
The assumed processes of the underlying four shocks are not appropriate for 
simulation until they are specified to be consistent with the baseline model. Two main 
reasons lie behind this. First of all, while goods sector productivity shock and 
monetary shock have non-controversy origins and can be easily backed up by 
conventional approach17, there are no well agreed counterparts for financial shocks, 
especially when we are considering the shocks from both supply and demand sides. 
Assuming different financial structures in the model economy might imply different 
shock processes. For instance, in Benk et al. (2008) exchange credit model, the 
autocorrelation for credit shock is 0.93, and the standard deviation of innovation is 
0.019. While in Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008) of credit creation model, the two 
corresponding parameters are 0.78 and 0.047 respectively. Christiano et al. (2010) 
report 0.53 and 0.025 for the financial wealth shock in their model. Based on these, I 
have to estimate the financial shock processes independently to capture the model 
                                                              
17  Goods sector productivity shock can be estimated from constructed Solow Residuals. Monetary 
shock can be estimated by using data on money supply. 
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consistent ones. Moreover, as argued in Ingram et al. (1994) and studies following up, 
any model that is in accord with the several time series that make up US 
macroeconomic data must feature multiple shocks that are correlated at all leads and 
lags. At least we cannot avoid the possibility of the correlations between the 
innovations driving the shock process. Therefore constructing consistent shocks 
nested in the model is not only desirable, but also necessary.  
To construct the four underlying shocks, the procedure in NT is adopted18, which is 
briefly described as follows. As assumed in section 2, the four shocks follow AR(1) 
processes. By giving initial values for the autocorrelation parameters, we can solve 
the model and recover the Markov decision rules numerically, which are written in 
state-space form as shown in Eq. (24) and (25). The model’s endogenous control 
variables are stacked in vector tdˆ , and the endogenous and exogenous state variables 
are contained in vector tsˆ . The sequence of the variables in tsˆ   is ordered in such a 
way that the endogenous predetermined state variables appear first and the exogenous 
states follow up. Eq. (25) can now be written more explicitly as 
]ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ[]ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ[
ˆˆˆ
321111131
232131


 tttt
n
ttttttt
ttt
fxarcwmqwnk
ssd
 ;    (25’) 
By solving the model, we recover the two coefficients matrices, 31 and 32 . In this 
case, we can estimate the processes of the four shocks if we assign values to tdˆ and 
ts1ˆ  from the data. This is straightforward from the ordinary least squares estimators 
for ]ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ[ tttt fxa   via the following transformation: 
                  ]ˆˆ[]ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ[ 1313213232 tttttt sdfxa   ;               (26) 
The identification of the four underlying shocks requires the data for at least four 
variables contained in tdˆ . More than four variables simply give an over 
identification estimation for the shocks. The choice of the preferred combination of 
variables is discussed below. 
Given the estimated series of the four shocks, what should be focused on next is to 
estimate each autocorrelation coefficient of the four processes. To account for the 
                                                              
18  Benk et al. (2005), (2008) and (2010) apply the same procedure extensively in a series of papers. A 
similar application can also be found in Chari et al. (2007) where they are trying to realize all the 
underlying wedges. 
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possible correlations between disturbances (heteroskedasticity), I apply the following 
seemingly unrelated regressions estimator (SURE)19: 
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;               (27) 
After obtaining the estimates of the first order autocorrelation coefficients for 
taˆ , tˆ , txˆ , and tfˆ , I substitute them back to the solution algorithm to get a new 
matrix 32 , then estimate the shock process again and proceed in an iterative fashion. 
Successive versions of 32   are calculated until a , m , x and f converge. Then 
the ultimate estimated autocorrelations and variance-covariance matrix (VCM) are 
used in the solution algorithm to simulate the model.  
As noted earlier, it should be borne in mind that the choice of the preferred 
combination of variables contained in tdˆ is crucial to generate robust time series of 
the underlying shocks. Both Benk et al. (2005) and NT argue that different 
combinations of variables in tdˆ   yield different shock processes so that it is not easy 
to identify how to pick up the correct bunch of variables. To solve this potential 
problem, NT proposed a rule of thumb criteria which states that the sensible 
combination should produce estimated processes for productivity shock and monetary 
shock that are highly correlated with their conventionally constructed counterparts 
from single equation estimation20. Based on this, they generate a time series for the 
shock to entrepreneurial net worth (loan demand shock) on the condition that the 
constructed TFP and monetary shock have high correlation with their conventional 
counterparts: 0.76 and 0.94. I follow the same strategy here to estimate both the loan 
demand and supply shocks. During the estimation, I tried different combinations of 
variables in tdˆ and distinguish the most plausible one that gives TFP and monetary 
shock highly correlated with their counterparts21. In particular, I picked up six 
variables that are suitable from tdˆ : ]ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ[ ttFttGtt wnmny  . Note that all of them 
are logged and linearly detrended, refer to Appendix for data description. To  
                                                              
19  The reason why the off-diagonal elements in the autocorrelation matrix are zero will be discussed 
below. 
20  Productivity shock is easily constructed via the detrended Solow residuals, given the data on per 
capita GDP, capital stock and labour. Monetary shock is more straightforward to recover by using 
the data on M1. 
21  Only the most plausible shock processes are plotted here while those from other combination are 
available upon request. 
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Fig. 2  DSGE and traditionally estimated total factor productivity 
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rationalize the choice, tyˆ , 
G
tnˆ and tmˆ are chosen to make plausible TFP and 
monetary shock while Ftnˆ is used to capture the dynamics of credit supply shock, tfˆ . 
twˆ and tˆ are also included in the estimation so that the credit demand shock is 
recovered close to that in NT22. 
Figure 2 plots the DSGE constructed and traditionally estimated TFP processes 
covering the sample period between 1964Q2 and 2009Q4. It is clear to see that the 
DSGE derived shock (solid line) mimics the traditionally estimated shock (dashed 
line) very well, with a very high correlation coefficient of 0.97 between them. On the 
other hand, the comparison of monetary shock between the two derivations (shown in 
figure 3) is less satisfied with the corresponding correlation of 0.76. The main 
discrepancy stems from the first half of the sample period, where the DSGE derived 
shock always underpredicts that from traditional estimation. This feature also presents 
in NT’s estimation of monetary shock, despite the fact that they have a considerably 
higher correlation of 0.94 between the two. Since there are no extant conventional 
counterparts of financial shock, it is currently impossible to assess the robustness of 
the estimation for financial shocks as we did for the previous two shocks. This also 
rationalizes the use of SURE as a plausible way to get autocorrelation coefficients and 
VCM discussed above. Nevertheless, the high correlation between the previous two 
and their corresponding counterparts justifies the validity of the two financial shocks 
from state-space derivation, plotted together in figure 4. The estimation of 
entrepreneurial net worth shock (left axis) is closely linked with that in NT23,  
                                                              
22  Actually, tmˆ and twˆ  are endogenous state variables and belong to 11ˆ ts . Picking them up is 
justified since their values are also determined in the Markov decision rulus and can be treated 
equally as variables in tdˆ . 23  Refer to figure 3 in Nolan and Thoenisson (2009). 
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Fig. 3  DSGE and traditionally estimated monetary shock 
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implying the shock construction process is not sensitive to the number of shocks. This 
shows a one step further validation of the loan productivity shock (right axis) 
generated here. 
The time series properties of the four shocks can be summarized as follows. First of 
all, the first order autocorrelation coefficients for the four shocks are 9433.0a , 
4189.0m , 9796.0x , and 8216.0f . The two financial shocks (demand 
and supply sides) are both more persistent than the growth rate of M1, but straddle the 
TFP shock. The net worth shock is more persistent than TFP while the loan 
productivity shock is less persistent. This ordering is consistent with that described in 
NT for the three shocks (excluding loan productivity) on the one hand and here on the 
other for the two shocks (TFP and money) derived from conventional estimation24. 
Turning to the VCM of the disturbances, both of the two VCM from DSGE 
construction and from traditional estimation are shown below: 












 
1235.230648.08035.19288.0
0648.00586.10387.11718.0
8035.10387.14582.21823.0
9288.01718.01823.04123.0
10 4DSGEVCM ; 
   

 
3861.21145.0
1145.03965.0
10 4TraVCM  
                                                              
24  The conventional derived shocks show that TFP is more persistent than the growth rate of M1, with 
9556.0a , 6097.0m . 
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Fig. 4  DSGE estimated net worth and loan productivity shocks 
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Net worth shock (LHA)
Loan productivity shock (RHA)
 
The comparison between DSGE constructed and traditionally estimated VCM shows 
that both of the DSGE TFP and money growth are slightly more volatile than their 
traditional counterparts. Moreover, the two are positively correlated in the two cases 
while the correlation between the DSGE derived ones is a little higher. The positive 
correlation between TFP and money growth is indicative of an historical 
accommodation of supply-side shocks by the Fed. Now focus on the VCM of DSGE 
constructed disturbances per se. The loan productivity (supply shock) is negatively 
correlated with TFP, but positively correlated with money growth, implying the loan 
supply side is more accommodative to monetary condition25. On the other hand, the 
net worth shock is negatively correlated with money growth (consistent with NT), but 
positively correlated with TFP (by contrast with NT). It seems more favorable to 
positive correlation between TFP and asset bubble since asset prices always burst 
during recessions. The negative correlation to money growth implies that the Fed goes 
against asset price bubbles26. It is noteworthy that the correlation between loan 
productivity and net worth shock is slightly negative ( 4100648.0  ), for which it 
shows the identification of supply side from demand side shock in credit markets. The 
volatilities of the  four shocks are ordered consistently to relevant studies in the 
literature. The net worth shock is more volatile than TFP but less volatile than money 
growth; in line with NT. The loan productivity is the most volatile one; also appears in  
                                                              
25  Benk et al. (2008) constructed an exchange credit shock process that also possesses positive 
correlation to money growth and negative correlation to TFP as the loan productivity extracted here. 
This shows a way of consistency despite that their shock is to consumption credit and my shock is for 
investment. 
26  There is a literature focusing on whether the central bank should respond to asset price when 
conducting monetary policy. See Bernanke and Gertler (1999). 
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Fig. 5  DSGE extracted financial shock(net worth) and EFP proxies 
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Benk et al. (2005). This can be possibly understood by the fact that shock in a specific 
sector is much more volatile than TFP which is an aggregate shock that results in the 
smoothing of all the idiosyncratic shocks from different sectors. 
It would be interesting to relate the DSGE extracted shocks with the post war NBER 
business cycle reference dates, which track recessions starting at the peak of a 
business cycle and ending at the trough. Figures 2 to 4 also highlight the 7 main 
recession episodes in the sample between 1964Q2 and 2009Q4 (including the most 
recent recession triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007): 1969Q4-1970Q4, 
1973Q4-1975Q1, 1980Q1-1980Q3, 1981Q3-1982Q4, 1990Q3-1991Q1, 
2001Q1-2001Q4 and 2008Q4-2009Q4 (end of sample). Figure 4 shows an apparent 
picture that every recession happened when both of the entrepreneurial net worth and 
loan production are in contraction. This is a fairly striking result, implying only one of 
the two financial shocks, either demand or supply side, is not strong enough to cause 
an economy-wide recession. For instance, the non recession era such as (1964-1965), 
(1985-1987) and (1992-1994) witness a contraction of entrepreneurial net worth while 
the loan productivity is in expansion. The boom in the supply of credit offsets the 
contraction in entrepreneurial sector and avoids economy-wide recessions. The 
reverse is also true as shown in the recession episodes of 1973Q4-1975Q1 and 
1981Q3-1982Q4 that the economic down-turn ceases earlier because the 
entrepreneurial sector recovers sooner than the credit supply. It is noteworthy that the 
recent recession could have recovered earlier since the loan supply started to expand 
during 2008 before the breakdown of Lehman Brothers, which reverse the credit 
expansion into a deeper contraction, as shown in the red line of figure 4. This  
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Fig. 6  DSGE extracted financial shock(loan productivity) and EFP proxies 
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implication is also apparent in Hirakata et al. (2010)27. On the other hand, the link 
between the peaks and troughs of the business cycle and the realized TFP and money 
growth shocks is less obvious than the financial shocks, of which is also present in 
NT. 
To assess the validity of the DSGE constructed financial shock, NT also plot it against 
the proxy of external finance premium, the spread between AAA rated corporate 
bonds and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, and find a strong negative correlation 
between the two. Here the same assessment procedure is followed, where both the 
loan productivity and net worth shock are plotted against the proxies of EFP. The 
spread of AAA rated corporate bonds as well as that of BAA and high yield bonds are 
used as the proxies28. Figure 5 and 6 plot the HP-filtered net worth and loan 
productivity shock respectively against the three HP-filtered proxies. 
The two figures indicate that both of the two shocks are significantly negatively 
correlated with the three proxies of EFP. With stronger correlation, it seems that larger 
fraction of the cyclical EFP  is accommodating the demand side of credit market. 
Nevertheless, the supply side effect shouldn’t be ignored completely. It is also found 
that the loan productivity leads those spreads for two or three quarters since the 
correlation between contemporaneous spreads and lagged loan productivity is higher 
in absolute value (not shown here), though the increment is fairly small (to about 
-0.37). This feature is not appearing for net worth shock. The corresponding  
                                                              
27  Refer to the figure 4 of their constructed shock processes with Bayesian approach.  
28  Gertler and Lown (1999) argue that the high-yield bond spread emerges as a particularly useful 
indicator of the external finance premium and financial conditions more generally in the last two or 
three decades. 
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Fig. 7  Impulse responses to financial shock (net worth) 
 
correlation between TFP and spreads, or money growth and spreads is fairly weak: 
(-0.03 to -0.13) and (0.14 to 0.21). 
4.2  Impulse responses to financial shocks 
This section briefly examines the impulse responses of the model economy to the two 
financial shocks. Figure 7 and 8 plot the responses of six variables that are attractive: 
output, investment, loan, capital price (Tobin’s q), net worth and external finance 
premium. It is apparent that the two negative shocks both drive down the economy as 
expected. The effect of the net worth shock is very strong and persistent; the economy 
goes to downturn for a very long period, as shown in NT. The responses to loan 
supply contraction is relatively weak, but still significant. The effect is also less 
persistent as the economy reverts back to steady state quickly. One interesting thing to 
notice is that the responses of loan volume are in opposite direction subject to the two 
shocks which are in the same direction. This rationalizes the earlier claim that the 
entrepreneurial net worth shock behaves more like a credit demand shock, while the 
loan productivity resembles a supply shock. Subject to a negative shock to net worth, 
the wealth of entrepreneurs contracts hugely because of the persistent effect; drops 
much deeper than that of capital demand. This makes the demand for external funds 
larger than before, pushing up the EFP. Thus a negative shock to net worth behaves 
like a positive shock to loan demand, driving up loan (quantity) and EFP (price) 
simultaneously. On the other hand, a negative shock to loan productivity resembles a      
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Fig. 8  Impulse responses to financial shock (loan productivity) 
 
credit supply contraction, accompanied with declining loan volume (quantity) and 
increasing EFP (price). 
4.3  Second moments 
Comparing the second moments of the model simulated series with the moments of 
the empirical series from the data is the traditional way to evaluate the performance of 
the business cycle models. Here I follow this strategy to assess how the business cycle 
performance of the model is altered after we add in the two financial shocks 
individually on the one hand and together on the other29. Table 3 summarizes the 
second moments of the key variables from data (1964:1-2009:4) and compares them 
with the data generated by four models (estimates from 100 repeated stochastic 
simulation) that are identical except that: Model 1 has both financial shocks; Model 2 
wipes out the supply sided financial shock; Model 3 gets rid of the net worth shock; 
Model 4 has no financial shock30.  
For the volatility part, as shown in panel A, the models with financial shocks, either 
one or both, come closer to data for output, investment, loan, hours, M1, inflation and 
EFP. Among the models with financial shocks, Model 3 comes closer to data for 
consumption, investment, real wage while Model 2 better matches for loan, hours and  
                                                              
29  The statistics for the model without financial frictions are not compared since Nolan and Thoenissen 
(2008) have done that extensively. 
30  The shocks in Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 are constructed separately by the same methodology 
described above. 
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Table 3  Second Moments (Data 1964Q2 to 2009Q4) 
Variables          Data 
Model 1 
(NW&LP shock)
Model 2 
(NW shock only)
Model 3 
(LP shock only) 
Model 4 
(No F_ shocks) 
A.  Volatility           
  % S.D. Relative   
to output 
% S.D. 
Relative   
to output
% S.D.
Relative  
to output
% S.D.
Relative  
to output  % S.D. 
Relative   
to output
Output 1.58 1.00  1.60  1.00  1.61  1.00  1.57  1.00  1.54  1.00 
Consumption 1.29  0.82  1.56  0.97  1.60  0.99  1.41  0.90  1.41  0.92 
Investment 5.26  3.33  8.12  5.07  8.19  5.09  4.14  2.64  3.88  2.52 
Loan 2.29  1.45  1.74  1.09  1.84  1.14  1.05  0.67  1.14  0.74 
Hours 1.88  1.19  2.07  1.29  2.03  1.27  2.41  1.54  2.34  1.52 
Real wage 0.97 0.61 0.76 0.48 0.75 0.47 0.91 0.58 0.91 0.59 
Real M1 3.21  2.03  2.57  1.61  2.63  1.64  1.98  1.26  1.98  1.29 
Nominal rate 0.41  0.26  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01 
Inflation 0.29  0.18  0.53  0.33  0.52  0.32  0.72  0.46  0.72  0.47 
EFP 0.35  0.22  0.43  0.27  0.33  0.20  0.33  0.20  0.16  0.10 
Net worth 2.25 1.42 17.04 10.65 17.23 10.70 8.59 5.47 8.10 5.26 
B.  Contemporaneous correlation with output (S.E.) 
Consumption 0.87 0.34 (0.14) 0.34 (0.12) 0.96 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01) 
Investment 0.90 0.82 (0.05) 0.81 (0.05) 0.95 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 
Loan 0.26        -0.24 (0.16)        -0.24 (0.13)        -0.17 (0.15)        -0.17 (0.14)
Hours 0.86 0.86 (0.03) 0.86 (0.03) 0.86 (0.04) 0.85 (0.04) 
Real wage 0.14        -0.05 (0.15)        -0.03 (0.13)        -0.28 (0.15)        -0.25 (0.16)
Real M1 0.14 0.19 (0.14) 0.19 (0.13) 0.95 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 
Nominal rate 0.38 0.19 (0.15) 0.34 (0.12)        -0.10 (0.09)        -0.12 (0.09)
Inflation 0.15 0.40 (0.09) 0.37 (0.09) 0.69 (0.05) 0.67 (0.05) 
EFP             -0.65        -0.72 (0.07)        -0.77 (0.06)        -0.64 (0.08)        -0.90 (0.03)
Net worth 0.58 0.81 (0.06) 0.80 (0.06) 0.94 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02) 
 
M1. For EFP, Model 3 performs as well as Model 2. The latter reconciles with the 
result highlighted in Nolan and Thoenissen (2008). There are two variables that all the 
models fail to predict the moments completely. One is the net worth for which all the 
models overpredict by 4 to 8 times; the other one is the nominal interest rate where all 
types predict less than 10% to the empirical counterpart. 
For the correlation with output, as shown in panel B, all the models (Model 1 to 
Model 4) correctly predicts the sign of the correlation with GDP for consumption, 
investment, hours, M1, inflation, EFP and net worth. For nominal interest rate, Model 
1 and 2 can predict the correct sign while Model 3 and 4 fail. None of the four models 
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predict the sign for loan and real wage correctly despite that both variables have 
nearly acyclical behaviour. On the quantitative perspective, Model 1 and 2 
underpredict the correlation with output of consumption, investment while Model 3 
and 4 overpredict. All the four versions of the model overpredict the correlation for 
M1, inflation and net worth. The only variable that all the four models capture 
perfectly simultaneously is hours. EFP, the most important variable in this study, is 
captured better by models with financial frictions and Model 3 performs best.  
Comparing across models with and without financial shocks reveals mixed results in 
the performance assessment. The contribution of financial shocks is not 
straightforward to identify. This complements some recent findings that financial 
accelerator plays limited role in the model’s transmission mechanism31. The main 
contribution of financial shocks in terms of matching the data’s second moments over 
the sample period is the ability to match the second moments of the EFP. For both the 
volatility and correlation with output, Model 3 with loan productivity shock on top of 
TFP and monetary shock performs the best. Although Model 1 and 2 are not far away 
from Model 3, the importance of supply side financial shock to determine the 
dynamics of EFP is revealed clearly. 
4.4  Historical decomposition of EFP 
To further confirm the conjecture from previous section that the loan productivity 
shock plays an important role in determining the dynamics of EFP, this part 
decomposes the variation of cyclical EFP into the four underlying shocks. Figure 9 
displays the time path of AAA spread (EFP proxy) and the contribution of each 
structural shock. The solid black line is the data of cyclical AAA spread from 1964Q2 
to 2009Q4. Red and blue bars refer to the contribution of monetary and TFP shock 
respectively while green and purple bars represent the contribution of the two 
financial shocks; net worth and loan productivity. The effect of TFP to the cyclical 
AAA spread is minor. The contribution of monetary shock seems larger, but still 
moderate. This can explain why the second moments (both the volatility and 
correlation with output) generated by model excluding financial shocks are far away 
from their empirical counterparts. The figure clearly shows that the seven notable 
economic recessions within the sample period, 1969Q4-1970Q4, 1973Q4-1975Q1, 
1980Q1-1980Q3, 1981Q3-1982Q4, 1990Q3-1991Q1, 2001Q1-2001Q4 and  
                                                              
31  See Meier and Muller (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008) who use strict econometric testing. 
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Fig. 9  Historical decomposition of EFP 
 
2008Q4-2009Q4, correspond well with the episodes when the AAA spreads are 
around cyclical peaks. Meanwhile, the cyclical peaks are contributed mostly by the 
two financial shocks. Each recession episode is companied by the situation when both 
of the two financial shocks predict a high EFP. The recent financial crisis is a notable 
case such that the EFPs driven by net worth as well as loan productivity are both 
unprecedentedly high. On the other hand, if the two shocks predict different sign for 
EFP,  the AAA spread is only moderate and the economy is not in recession (e.g., 
mid 1980s and mid 1990s). After combining figure 4 and 9, it is fair to claim that both 
of the two shocks from financial sector are significant and important to determine the 
cyclical behaviour of EFP. 
4.5  Variance decompositions 
In this section, I measure the contribution of each of the four shock processes to EFP 
as well as other key macroeconomic time series. Here I follow the procedure applied 
in Hirakata et al. (2010). Table 4 reports the variance decompositions for output, 
consumption, investment, loan, hours, federal funds rate, inflation, EFP and net 
worth32. It is apparent that the net worth shock accounts for the largest fraction of 
variation for output, investment, loan, hours, federal funds rate, EFP and net worth 
itself. These results are in line with that in NT, predicting the net worth shock is the 
dominant force for the variation of above variables. Not surprisingly to see the  
                                                              
32In calculating the variance decompositions, I first calculate the volatility of the endogenous variable 
conditional on each of the shocks, and then sum these volatilities to calculate the share of each shock. 
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Table 4  Variance decomposition 
Variables Percentage owing to: 
 TFP Money growth Net worth Loan productivity
   Output    8.72%  34.78%  51.07%    5.42% 
Consumption  19.84%  46.86%  20.95%  11.00% 
   Investment    1.96%  21.85%  71.16%    5.02% 
   Loan  18.86%  17.97%  56.89%    6.33% 
   Hours  13.69%  32.99%  48.40%    4.93% 
   Nominal rate  12.63%  32.98%  52.07%    2.31% 
   Inflation  27.01%  34.14%  32.90%    5.94% 
   EFP    3.63%  16.68%  53.92%  25.76% 
   Net worth   2.16% 21.85% 71.16%   5.02% 
 
fluctuations of inflation is mainly determined by the monetary shock, which is the 
genuine natural cause of inflation. For EFP, we can still find the significant influence 
from the loan productivity shock, despite the main dominant force is still net wealth 
shock. About one third of the total effect on EFP from financial sector comes from the 
supply side of the credit market. 
5  Conclusion 
In this paper, I make one step further based on Zhang (2010) to quantitatively assess 
the role played by the shocks originated from the banking sector in the U.S. business 
cycle. Specifically, I build a model that generally follows the setup of BGG and NT 
except for the banking sector, where I replace the optimal contracting problem of 
BGG with an explicit profit maximization problem in the banking sector subject to a 
loan production function. In consequence, both the demand side (entrepreneurial 
sector) and supply side (banking sector) of the credit market contribute to the 
financial frictions. In the model context, four exogenous shocks, including two 
conventional structural shocks (TFP and monetary) and the two financial sector 
shocks (entrepreneurial net wealth and loan productivity), are constructed by 
combining the data and the model’s linear state-space solution. The shock to the 
technology in loan production resembles the disturbance originating in the banking 
sector. Together with the shock to entrepreneurial net wealth, we can analyse the 
contribution of the disturbance from both the supply and demand side of the financial 
market. 
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The main results can be summarized as follows. First of all, the DSGE extracted TFP 
and monetary shock are observationally similar to their counterparts constructed with 
traditional estimation while entrepreneurial net worth shock is close to the one 
constructed in NT. Secondly, every post war recession is crashed with the situation 
that both the entrepreneurial net worth and the loan productivity shock are in 
contraction; either one of them is not strong enough to cause an economy-wide 
recession. Thirdly, both of the extracted loan productivity and net worth shock are 
negatively correlated with proxies of EFP. Fourth, the variance decomposition 
indicates that loan productivity shock is an important source of EFP variation, though 
the dominant driving force is still net worth shock. Finally, net worth shock is still a 
dominant factor even after we include the loan productivity shock. 
This study rationalizes one interesting point raised in NT that the entrepreneurial net 
worth shock remains contractionary after recessions have ended. This is because the 
shock from the other side of the credit market, the loan productivity, starts the 
expansion. Another notable point from the analysis is subject to the recent economic 
recession. The terrible economic downturn could stop earlier since the loan supply is 
found to expand during 2008. However, the breakdown of Lehman Brothers reverses 
the credit expansion into a deeper contraction. This point is still searching for the 
empirical support. 
For future research, it is always attractive to incorporate the banks’ balance sheet 
condition into the analysis. The importance of bank capital, either for the transmission 
mechanism or as an independent source of aggregate fluctuations, is still under 
exploration. 
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Appendix  Data description 
Data are expressed in per-capita terms using population over 16 (expressed in billions) 
in quarterly base. 
GDP,  tY : Gross Domestic Product, in billions of dollars, deflated by the Implicit 
Price Deflator of GDP. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Consumption,  tC : Personal Consumption Expenditures (non-durables plus services), 
in billions of dollars, deflated by the Implicit Price Deflator of GDP. Source: Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. 
Investment,  tI : Private Fixed Investment, in billions of dollars, deflated by the 
Implicit Price Deflator of GDP. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Inflation,  t : first difference of the log of the Implicit Price Deflator of GDP. Source: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Real wage,  tw : Real Average Hourly Compensation for nonfarm business sector. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Wage inflation,  t : first difference of the log of the Average Hourly Compensation 
for nonfarm business sector. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Capital,  tK : quarterly series is constructed using annual capital stock data and 
quarterly data on investment expenditure. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Tobin’s q, tQ : constructed using Eq. (2.18L) and the data on investment and capital. 
Net worth, tNW : nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business net worth (market value) 
taken from the flow of funds account. 
Money,  tt PM : Real per capita M1. 
Nominal interest rate,  ntR : 3-month average of the daily effective federal funds rate. 
Source: Federal Reserve System. 
Hours worked,  GtN : nonfarm business sector index, hours of all persons. Source: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Banking hours,  FtN : product of two series: average weekly hours of production 
workers and production workers, thousands in the financial sector. Source: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
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